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with the standard and reasonable practice set by the banking community, a
task which a depositor is in a singularly poor position to undertake, regardless of
the facts of the case."0
Perhaps some courts, faced with the Code's provision, might follow the lead
of the South Carolina decision,5' salvaging in part the stop payment duty by
placing the burden of proof on the bank as to absence of negligence, or by
directing the jury's attention to the inferences which arise from a situation
when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is appropriate. 2
But even so, it is difficult to understand the inclusion of this provision in the
same Article which recognizes the only major flaw in the present stop payment
rules, and handsomely corrects its unreasonable harshness on payor banks by
allowing subrogation. It would seem more reasonable for the Code to have
chosen the course of efficiency and simplicity by making explicit the public
policy which for more than a century has defined stop payment as a service to
the business community which a bank must perform, if it is to be done at all,
because there is no one else who can.
given, (4) that the check was nevertheless paid, and (5) that the money was demanded from
the drawee, which demand was refused. 6 Zollman, Banks and Banking § 3711 (1936).
The UCC provides specifically only that: "The burden of establishing the fact and amount
of loss resulting from the payment of an item contrary to a binding stop order is on the customer." UCC § 4-403(3). The critical question-who bears the burden of proof as to "due
care"-is not treated. The usual rule would appear to apply. See note 51 infra.
50 A somewhat comparable situation is that in which a depositor claims loss of property
from a bank safe deposit box. In spite of the ease of perjury in the deposit box cases, the
courts have often, although not always, ruled that there is a presumption of negligence on the
part of the depositary arising from the depositor's testimony that the property was placed in
the box and never returned. See e.g., Veihelmann v. Manufacturers' Safe Deposit Co., 303 N.Y.
526, 104 N.E. 2d 888 (1952). The outcome may depend on the form of the depositor's complaint. See Liability for Loss-of Contents of Safe-Deposit Box, 133 A.L.R. 279, 291 (1941);
Ability of Banks to Limit Liability by Contract, 26 Notre Dame Lawyer 476 (1951).
61Carroll v. South Carolina Nat. Bank, 211 S.C. 406, 412, 45 S.E. 2d 729, 731 (1947),
where the court said, "[Wie think the admitted facts show a prima fade case of liability and the
burden of producing evidence to overcome appellant's prima facie case by showing that it
acted in good faith and used all reasonable efforts to comply with the instructions given
rested on respondent.... Appellant would not be expected to know these facts." And see
Chicago Savings Bank v. Block, 126 11.App. 128, (1906). Apparently this rule is followed in
Pennsylvania. Thomas v. First Nat. Bank of Scranton, 126 L.I. 203 (Pa., 1952). But the general rule is that the full burden of proof must be sustained by the drawer. 9 C.J.S., Banks and
Banking § 411 (1938).
"See Prosser, Torts §§ 43, 44 (1941).

DEFAMATION IMMUNITY FOR EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
The increasing publicity afforded the workings of government and the current concern over subversive activity' present in an acute form the familiar
I For other examples of the impact of the fear of subversion on traditional areas of the law,
see Communists and the Right to Bail, 20 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 330 (1953); Defamation Immunity, 18 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 591 (1951).
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problems underlying the doctrine of absolute immunity for defamation by executive officers. Matson v. Margiotti,2 a recent Pennsylvania case, is illustrative.
Defendant, Pennsylvania's Attorney General, wrote to a district attorney alleging that the latter's assistant, plaintiff, was guilty of "communistic activities," 3
and demanding her discharge. Defendant released the letter to the press prior to
mailing it. Upon appeal of plaintiff's libel action the court held defendant absolutely privileged, both in writing the letter and releasing it to the press. A strong
dissent was entered by the minority. The case thus illuminates two aspects of
the problem: (1) the degree of immunity which attends communications between executive officers of government, and (2) the immunity arising upon the
release to the press of such communications.
I
The absolute immunity 4 from libel and slander suits5 which the law affords
certain public officials represents a drastic solution of the conflict between two
important interests: the right of the individual to be secure in his reputation and
the need of society for the free performance and full disclosure of its business.'
Until recently, absolute immunity was confined to legislative, judicial, and
sometimes military proceedings,7 but has now been generally extended to at
8
least the chief executive officers of the state or nation.
A similar defense, conditional or qualified privilege, is often afforded when
absolute immunity is inappropriate. Its protection is much less complete, being
2Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A. 2d 892 (1952).
3
Mrs. Matson was subsequently cleared by the Bar Association of Allegheny County
of the charges alleged. Ibid., at 193 and 895.
4"Immunity" and "privilege" are interchangeable terms though their connotations make
the former seem preferable. Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings,
9 Col. L. Rev. 463 (1909).
5Privilege, absolute or conditional, covers a wider range of wrong than mere defamation.
Whenever private rights are injured by the legitimate performance of public duty a privilege
arises. See Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F. 2d 557 (App. D.C., 1934), cert. denied,
293 U.S. 605 (1934) (damage suit for .the erroneous imposition of a federal tax); Brown v.
Rudolph, 25 F. 2d 540 (App. D.C., 1928) (damage suit for the institution of lunacy proceedings
against plaintiff); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) (damage suit for interference with
contract). Defamation, however, constitutes the largest and most informative area of the
privilege's operation.
8
Veeder, op. cit. supra note 4.
7
Raymond'v. Croll, 233 Mich. 268, 206 N.W. 556 (1925); Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23,
81 Atl. 1013 (1911); Peterson v. Steenerson, 113 Minn. 87, 129 N.W. 147 (1910); Newell,
Slander and Libel § 351 (4th ed., 1924); Edwards, Libel-Absolute Privilege-Public Officials,
3 Ga. Bar J., p. 73 (May, 1941); Defamation-Privilege-Extension of Absolute Privilege,
26 Mich. L. Rev. 451 (1928). In this country, legislative immunity is frequently founded on
constitutional provisions. Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative and Executive Proceedings, 10 Col. L. Rev. 131, 134 (1910). Article I, Section 6 of the United States
Constitution provides: "The Senators and Representatives... shall in all cases, except
Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest ...and for any Speech
or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place." The latter provision confers absolute immunity for any words uttered in debate on the floor of Congress.
v. Couzens, 42 F. 2d 783 (App. D.C., 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 874 (1930).
Cochran
8
Rest., Torts § 591 (1938).
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contingent upon the defendant's good faith in doing the act complained of.9 No
liability will be imposed when the motive was bona fide, and to determine this
a judicial inquiry must be had.1" Absolute privilege, however, precludes any inquiry whatever into the propriety of the defendant's motives. Once the privileged occasion is established, malice and bad faith are irrelevant and no redress
is given the injured party."
The policy behind this defense is one of protection from harassment. Were the
policy merely one of protection from liability, a conditional privilege would suffice to protect all but those public officials who act in bad faith. But absolute
immunity is designed to protect the official from the suit itself, from the expense, publicity, and danger of defending the good faith of his public actions before a jury.'2And yet, beyond this lies a deeper purpose, the protection of society's
interest in the unfettered discharge of public business and in full public knowledge of the facts and conduct of such business. Absolute immunity is thus a
means of removing any inhibition which might deprive the public of the best
service of its officers and agencies.
This purpose prescribes the defense's limits. Absolute immunity, requiring
the surrender of personal rights for the good of the whole, 3 should be granted
only in cases of necessity. It is the public's good, not the official's, which is the
ultimate reason for the rule. Therefore, the privilege should be confined to those
officials whose functions are so necessary that individual rights must be subordinated. Society and the individuals who compose it should not be forced to
surrender their rights in return for relatively unimportant services. For offices
of less than paramount importance a conditional privilege, sustainable in the
great majority of cases, is fully adequate.
II
Since the beginning of the century the defense of absolute immunity has been
increasingly afforded to executive officers, 4 often with dubious results. 16 The
9Ibid., at § 593.
10Ibid., at § 619. "(1) The court determines whether the occasion upon which the defendant
published the defamatory matter was privileged. (2) Subject to the control of the court
whenever the issue arises, the jury determines whether the defendant did or did not abuse a
conditionally privileged occasion."
n3 ibid., at p. 223, introductory note.
1 "The purpose of the law is, not to protect malice or malevolence, but to guard persons
acting honestly in the discharge of a public function.., from being harassed by actions imputing to them dishonesty and malice." Veeder, op. cit. supra note 4, at 469.
13
Newell, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 341.
14Libel and Slander-Extension of the Doctrine of Absolute Privilege to Inferior Executive and Administrative Officials, 40 Mich. L. Rev. 919 (1942); Libel and Slander-Statutory
Extension of the Defense of Absolute Immunity, 11 Fordham L. Rev. 99 (1942); Edwards,
op. cit. supra note 7; 26 Mich. L. Rev., op. cit. supra note 7.
15E.g., Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 105, 166 S.W. 2d 909 (1942) (defendants
filed with the Board of Insurance Commissioners a statement of a third party, forged by its
agents, alleging the plaintiff, an ex-employee of defendant, had attempted to collect an insurance premium: held, the statement was absolutely privileged); White v. Holderby, 192 F.
2d 722 (C.A. 5th, 1951) (defendant filed with a Georgia board of education a complaint charg-
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officers first encompassed were of cabinet rank,16 the importance of cabinet
functions giving a sound basis for the immunity.
Spalding v. Vilas,17 a leading American case, was an action against the Postmaster General by a lawyer who held numerous powers of attorney from local
postmasters to secure and collect salary adjustments due them by act of Congress. The defendant, forced to act by mandatory legislation secured by the
plaintiff, mailed the checks directly to the interested parties and enclosed a letter stating that the attorney's services were unnecessary under the statute. He
stated that a second statute rendered "any transfer of this claim or power of
attorney for receiving payment. . . null and void."' 8 Plaintiff sued for damages
incurred in collecting attorney's fees and for injury to his reputation. The Supreme Court held the defendant absolutely immune. His reference of interested
parties to statutes concerning their business was within his proper functions.
The fact that defendant's interpretation of the second statute was inaccurate,
even if maliciously motivated, gave rise to no liability since the interpretation
was made and announced in the performance of duty.19 Quoting Bradley v.
0
Fisher,"
the Court distinguished an officer's action wholly without authority
and one merely in excess of authority. The former permits of no excuse while
21
the latter is privileged.
The Spalding rule has been widely followed. It is generally felt that officials
of at least cabinet rank"l should be protected from harassing lawsuits questioning in substance the plaintiffs were Negroes and the children should therefore be barred
from attending a "white" school: held, that under a Georgia statute this was a proceeding
before a court of competent jurisdiction and as such was absolutely privileged).
16Ryan v. Wilson, 231 Iowa 33, 300 N.W. 707 (1941); Glass v. Ickes, 117 F. 2d 273 (App.
D.C., 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 718 (1941); Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.
2d 557 (App. D.C., 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 605 (1934); Mellon v. Brewer, 18 F. 2d 168
(App. D.C., 1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 530 (1927); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1895);
Rest., Torts § 591 (1938); 40 Mich. L. Rev., op. cit. supra note 14; 26 ibid., op. cit. supra note 7.
17 161 U.S. 483 (1895).
19 "The act of the head

18 Ibid., at 492.

of one of the departments of government in calling the attention of
any person having business with such department to a statute relating in any way to such business, cannot be made the foundation of a cause of action against such officers." Ibid., at 493.
20 13 Wall. (U.S.) 335,350-51 (1871) (an action against a judge for damages sustained by an
attorney through the defendant's action in depriving him of his right to practice before the
court: held, defendant's action was absolutely privileged).
21
"We are of the opinion that the same general considerations of public policy and convenience which demand for judges... immunity from civil suits... apply to a large extent
to official communications made by heads of Executive Departments when engaged in the discharge of duties imposed upon them by law.... [We recognize a distinction between action
taken... in reference to matters which are manifestly or palpably beyond his authority,
and action having more or less connection with the general matters committed by law to his
control or supervision.... [Ihf he acts, having authority, his conduct cannot be made the
foundation of a suit against him personally for damages, even if the circumstances show that
he is not disagreeably impressed by the fact that his action injuriously affects the claims of particular individuals." Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498-99 (1895).
22 Federal officers: Glass v. Ickes, 117 F. 2d 273 (App. D.C., 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
718 (1941) (Secretary of the Interior); Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F. 2d 557
(App. D.C., 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 605 (1934) (Secretary of the Treasury); Mellon
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ing their good faith, judgment, discretion, or interpretation of facts.23 Whatever
24
dissent exists is largely confined to older and less clear-cut authority. But
though the Spalding rule originally covered only heads of executive depart25
ments, the courts have extended the doctrine to include lower officials.
The first step was to cover the inferior with the immunity of his superior.
De Arnaud v. Ainsworth" involved a libel action on the indirect publication of a
report of a bureau chief to the Secretary of War on the claims of a self-professed
Civil War hero. The court reasoned that as the defendant was properly investigating and reporting to the Secretary on the plaintiff's claims
the same reason applies for the privilege of the report that would apply if the investigation and report had been made by the Secretary in person ....21 It is, therefore, not
the particular position of the party making the report or communication that entitles
it to absolute privilege so much as the occasion 28 for making it, and the reasons of
public policy for the immunity. 29
A few years later, Farr v. Valentine3" gave immunity in his own right to an inferior in his reports to a cabinet officer and, by implication, in his communications to his subordinates as well. The defendant Commissioner of Indian Affairs wrote to the Secretary of the Interior concerning plaintiff's incompetent
v. Brewer, 18 F. 2d 168 (App. D.C., 1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 530 (1927) (Secretary of
the Treasury); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1895) (Postmaster General). State officers:
Ryan v. Wilson, 231 Iowa 33, 300 N.W. 707 (1941) (Governor of Iowa). Numerous inferior
state officers have been extended absolute privilege; a fair presumption, therefore, is that the
top officers of those states are also included. Rest., Torts § 591 (1938). See also 40 Mich. L.
Rev., op. cit. supra note 14; 26 ibid., op. cit: supra note 7.
23 See Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F. 2d 135 (App. D.C., 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 642
(1938); Rest., Torts § 591 (1938); Edwards, op. cit. supra note 7.
24 Peterson v. Steenerson, 113 Minn. 87, 129 N.W. 147 (1910) (libel suit against an acting
postmaster: in a dictum, the court refused to extend absolute privilege to any but judicial
and legislative officers); Maurice v. Worden, 54 Md. 233 (1880) (libel suit against a naval
officer: dictum that absolute privilege attached only to judicial and legislative proceedings).
2 This extension has sometimes led to startling results. See, e.g., Donner v. Francis, 255
Ill. App. 409 (1930) (libelous charges made by a hospital official of the Veterans Bureau
against a subordinate held absolutely privileged); Haskell v. Perkins, 165 Ill.
App. 144 (1911)
(libelous charges by an architect against his superintendent of construction, both being employees of the Board of Education, held absolutely privileged).
2624 App. D.C. 167 (1904), appeal dismissed, 199 U.S. 616 (1905).
2

7Ibid., at 177.

'Occasion' has long been a word of art used by the courts when dealing with the
problem of absolute privilege. It connotes a wider range than the discussion merely of the
merits of the central issue." Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 587, 37 N.E. 2d 584, 591-92
(1941).
In the area of qualified privilege, the term "occasion" covers a much broader sweep of
activity than in absolute privilege. For example: "When a communication is fairly made
by one in the discharge of a public or private duty, legal, moral, or social, of perfect or imperfect
obligation, or in the conduct of his own affairs, to one who has a corresponding interest or
duty to receive such communication, the occasion is privileged." International & G.N.R. Co.
28 "

v. Edmundson, 222 S.W. 181, 183 (Tex. Comm. App., 1920).
See Goodhart, Defamatory Statements and Privileged Occasions, 56 L.Q. Rev. 262 (1940),
for a general discussion of privileged occasion.
2 24 App. D.C. at 180-81.
3038 App. D.C. 413 (1912).
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service in the Bureau. He made similar communications to a subordinate and
related the substance of these communications orally to the Secretary. The
court granted immunity on libel and slander counts, but remarked that "[hlad
the defendant communicated to one to whom he was under no obligation or duty
to report ... a different case would be presented." 31 This development culminated in the assertion of an Illinois court in Donner v. FranciS2 that "[a]ll com-

munications, either verbal or written, passing between public officers pertaining
to their duties and in the conduct of public business are of necessity absolutely
privileged." 3 3 No distinction was drawn between communications up or down
the hierarchy, reports of consequence or trivia, the remarks of a cabinet officer
or those of a secretary to a petty official.
The policy announced in the Spalding case was not intended to afford absolute immunity to a hospital official as in the Donner case nor to a public architect as in Haskell v. Perkins.'4 The importance of the functions of such officials
warrants only a conditional immunity. Nevertheless, state and federal courts
alike have extended absolute immunity to public servants lower and lower in
the executive hierarchy. 5 Occasionally, the wisdom of this policy has been questioned" or a refusal to follow it has occurred,3" but generally the Donner view
has prevailed 38 even to immunizing in some cases actions of a quasi-public or
at 421.
".Ibid., at 412-13.
Ill. App. 409 (1930).
34 165 I. App. 144 (1911).
2540 Mich. L. Rev., op. cit. supra note 14; Fordham L. Rev., op. cit. supra note 14; Edwards, op. cit. supra note 7; 26 Mich. L. Rev., op. cit. supra note 7. The extension, however,
has not been solely through the common law. Occasionally, statutes have been interpreted to
provide absolute immunity for any proceeding under authority of law. See Libel and SlanderAbsolute Immunity under Statute, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 732 (1940); Fordham L. Rev., op. cit.
supra note 14, citing the extension of absolute privilege by statute to communication made
"in the proper discharge of official duty" [Calif. Civ. Code (Deering, 1923) § 47; Mont. Rev.
Code (Choate, 1921) § 5692; N.D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) § 4354; S.D. Rev. Code (1919)
§ 99], the author concludes that, contrary to the principal case of Hughes v. Bizzel, 189 Okla.
472, 117 P. 2d 763 (1941), the legislative intent manifested by the word "proper" indicates
a grant of only a qualified and not an absolute privilege.
' See concurring opinion of Groner, C. J., in Glass v. Ickes, 117 F. 2d 273, 283 (App. D.C.,
1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 718 (1941).
"7See, e.g., Peeples v. State, 179 Misc. 272, 38 N.Y.S. 2d 272 (S. Ct., 1942), in which the
publicly released report of the state audit department contained defamatory matter about the
plaintiff, a village police justice. The court held that absolute immunity was not designed to
protect all public officers but only those who perform important public services. The report in
this case carried a qualified privilege which was sufficient. See also Tanner v. Stevenson, 138
Ky. 578, 128 S.W. 878 (1910); Raymond v. Croll, 233 Mich. 268, 206 N.W. 556 (1925).
1S In the states: Schlinkert v. Henderson, 331 Mich. 284, 49 N.W. 2d 180 (1951) (letter
from member of Liquor Control Commission to Civil Service Commission); Powers v. Vaughn,
212 Mich. 297, 20 N.W. 2d 196 (1945) (report of Department of Health to common council);
Hughes v. Bizzel, 189 Okla. 472, 117 P. 2d 763 (1941) (statement of university president to
Board of Regents); Layne v. Kirby, 278 Pac. 1046 (Cal. App., 1929), rev'd on other grounds,
208 Cal. 694, 284 Pac. 441 (1930) (letter by subordinate clerk in government engineer's office
to his superiors); Stivers v. Allen, 115 Wash. 136, 196 Pac. 663 (1921) (statement of U.S. District Attorney to Secret Service agent); Bolton v. Walker, 197 Mich. 699, 164 N.W. 420
(1917) (statement of an ex-officio member of Board of Estimates to the Board); DeBolt v.
McBrien, 96 Neb. 237, 147 N.W. 462 (1914) (letter from state Superintendent of Schools to a
31 Ibid.,
2255
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private nature. Nor has the doctrine been limited solely to interofficial communications, being sometimes extended to the public reports and activities of
40
officials.
Absolute immunity has also expanded rapidly in the field of quasi-judicial
and legislative activity. Relying upon the analogy to established courts and
legislatures, the decisions have often found the mere presence of quasi-judicial
or legislative power controlling regardless of the public importance of the activities. 41 A more serious departure from sound policy occurs when private or
County superintendent); Haskell v. Perkins, 165 Ill. App. 144 (1911) (report of architect of
Board of Education to the Board); Trebilcock v. Anderson, 117 Mich. 39, 75 N.W. 129 (1898)
(mayor's veto to council).
In the federal courts: Harwood v. McMurty, 22 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Ky., 1938) (revenue
agent's report to his superiors); United States, to Use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, 69 F. 2d 383
(App. D.C., 1934) (consul's report to State Department); Miles v. McGrath, 4 F. Supp. 603 (D.
Md., 1933) (report of naval medical officer to his captain); Farr v. Valentine, 38 App. D.C. 413
(1912) (letter from Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Secretary of Interior); De Arnaud v.
Ainsworth, 24 App. D.C. 167 (1904), appeal dismissed, 199 U.S. 616 (1904) (report of bureau
chief to Secretary of War).
In the courts of England: M. Isaacs and Sons, Ltd. v. Cook, [1925] 2 K.B. 391 (report of
High Commissioner of Australia to Prime Minister of Australia); Adams v. Ward, [1917]
A.C. 309 (report of Army Council to Parliament and the nation); Chatterton v. Secretary of
State for India in Council, [18951 2 Q.B. 189 (report of the Secretary of State to an undersecretary). In the Chatterton case, the court, at p. 191, quoting a textwriter with approval,
said: "For reasons of public policy the same protection [absolute privilege] would, no doubt,
be given to anything in the nature of an act of state, e.g., to every communication relating
to state matters made by one minister to another, or to the Crown."
39 See, e.g., Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 105, 166 S.W. 2d 909 (1942); White
v. Holderby, 192 F. 2d 722 (C.A. 5th, 1951).
40
Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 37 N.E. 2d 584 (1941) (libel suit against the
author of an officially published argument against a constitutional amendment); Cooper v.
O'Connor, 99 F. 2d 135 (App. D.C., 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 642 (1938) (suit for malicious
prosecution against Comptroller of Currency for instigating prosecution of plaintiff for violation of banking laws); Brown v. Rudolph, 25 F. 2d 540 (App. D.C., 1928), cert. denied, 277 U.S.
605 (1928) (suit against the District of Columbia Commissioners for lunacy proceedings previously conducted against plaintiff); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F. 2d 396 (C.A. 2d, 1926), aff'd, 275 U.S.
503 (1926) (malicious prosecution by an assistant attorney general against a special assistant to
the U.S. Attorney General for suit charging the plaintiff with defrauding the government);
Samuelson v. Vinyard, 120 Ore. 197, 251 Pac. 719 (1926) (school board resolution censuring a
teacher); Barton v. Rogers, 21 Idaho 609, 123 Pac. 478 (1912) (resolution of the board of
trustees libeling a teacher). Contra: Peeples v. State, 179 Misc. 272, 38 N.Y.S. 2d 690 (S. Ct.,
1942) (public report of the state department of audit and control).
41 State cases: Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Adams, 196 Okla. 597, 168 P. 2d 105 (1946)
(petition to the state Industrial Commission to reopen an award); Reagan v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 105, 166 S.W. 2d 909 (1942) (affidavit filed with the state Board of Insurance
Commissioners); Hughes v. Bizzel, 189 Okla. 472, 117 P. 2d 763 (1941) (remarks of university
president to Board of Regents about an employee); Roberts v. Pratt, 174 Misc. 585, 21 N.Y.S.
2d 545 (S. Ct., 1940) appeal dismissed, 286 N.Y. 568, 35 N.E. 2d 922 (1941), cert. denied
315 U.S. 613 (1940) (statements made to an assistant attorney general during a pending
prosecution); White v. Brinkman, 23 Cal. App. 2d 307, 73 P. 2d 254 (1937) (malicious prosecution by building contractor against building inspector for prosecution under a local building ordinance); Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 165 Tenn. 447, 55 S.W. 2d 767 (1933)
(statements to state Insurance Commissioner); Krumin v. Bruknes, 255 Ill. App. 503 (1930)
(affidavits filed with Naturalization Bureau); Layne v. Kirby, 278 Pac. 1046 (Cal. App., 1929),
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quasi-public proceedings, institutions, and officers are afforded full immunity
for their conduct. 2 Other courts, however, have held such activity possessed
43
only of a conditional privilege.
Examination of the cases reveals two distinct requirements for the grant of
absolute immunity to official communications: (1) the defamatory remarks must
have some relevance to the subject matter of the communication, 44 and (2) the
communication must be relevant to the duties of the officer.4" The latter conception is summarized in the term "occasion, ' 46which implies an obligation or duty
rev'd on other grounds, 208 Cal. 694, 284 Pac. 441 (1930) (letter by subordinate clerk to his
superior attacking his chief clerk); McAlister & Co. v. Jenkins, 214 Ky. 802, 284 S.W. 88
(1926) (statement by Real Estate Commission attacking a real estate company); Samuelson
v. Vinyard, 120 Ore. 197, 251 Pac. 719 (1926) (school board resolution censuring a teacher);
Bolton v. Walker, 197 Mich. 699, 164 N.W. 420 (1917) (charges of member of Detroit Board
of Estimates against a fellow member at a meeting); Larkin v. Noonan, 19 Wis. 82 (1865)
(petition to the Governor for removal of a sheriff). Contra: Pecue v. West, 233 N.Y. 316, 135
N.E. 515 (1922).
Federal cases: White v. Holderby, 192 F. 2d 722 (1951) (complaint to Board of Education); Johnson v. Independent Life and Accident Ins. Co. of Jacksonville, Fla., 94 F. Supp. 959
(E.D. S.C., 1951) (letter to Insurance Commissioner giving reasons for the termination of
plaintiff's employment); Love v. Snyder, 184 F. 2d 840 (C.A. 4th, 1950) (statements during an
appeal before the Civil Service Commission); Smith v. O'Brien, 88 F. 2d 769 (App. D.C., 1937)
(statements by Tariff Commission chairman to a job applicant). See also 38 Mich. L. Rev.,
op. cit. supra note 35.
2 White v. Holderby, 192 F. 2d 722 (C.A. 5th, 1951) (complaint by an individual to the
board of education); Johnson v. Independent Life and Accident Ins. Co. of Jacksonville, Fla.,
94 F. Supp. 959 (E.D. S.C., 1951) (letter sent to state Insurance Commissioner); Pacific
Employers Ins. Co. v. Adams, 196 Okla. 597, 168 P. 2d 105 (1946) (petition to state Industrial
Commission); Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 105, 166 S.W. 2d 909 (1942)
(charges against ex-employee filed with the Board of Insurance Commissioners); Sanford
v. Howard, 185 Okla. 660, 95 P. 2d 644 (1939) (report of university president to Board of
Regents); Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 165 Tenn. 447, 55 S.W. 2d 767 (1933) (statements to state Insurance Commissioner); Krumin v. Bruknes, 255 Ill.
App. 503 (1930) (affidavit filed with Naturalization Bureau); Larkin v. Noonan, 19 Wis. 82 (1865) (petition to the
Governor for the removal of a sheriff). Contra: Peinhardt v. West, 22 Ala. App. 231, 115 So. 80
(1927), rev'd, 217 Ala. 12, 115 So. 88 (1927) (charges filed by an individual with the mayor and
against the chief of police: on reversal, the court held that the charges were only qualifiedly
privileged as was the publication of them as official documents).
43
Roberts v. Pratt, 174 Misc. 585, 21 N.Y.S. 2d 545 (S.Ct., 1940), appeal dismissed, 286
N.Y. 568, 35 N.E. 2d 922 (1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 613 (1940) (charges made against
the proprietor of a collecting agency before the local Bar Association and presented to the
State Attorney General); Pecue v. West, 233 N.Y. 316, 135 N.E. 515 (1922) (charges made in a
letter to the District Attorney; the proceeding was held "not [to be] in substance judicial");
Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23, 81 AUt. 1013 (1911) (accusations made by a priest from the
pulpit); Bingham v. Gaynor, 203 N.Y. 27, 96 N.E. 84 (1911) (charges against police commissioner filed with mayor).
41"Of course, when a party steps aside from duty and introduces into his report or communication defamatory matter wholly irrelevant and foreign to the subject of the inquiry [he
would not be entitled to absolute privilege]." De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App. D.C. 167, 178
(1904), appeal dismissed, 199 U.S. 616 (1904).

4 See note 21 supra; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1895); Farr v. Valentine, 38 App. D.C.

413 (1912).
46 See

note 28 supra.
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upon the communicator to inform another who has a corresponding interest,
duty, or obligation to receive the communication. 7 Thus, if an official communicates to an outsider who has no "right" to be informed, no occasion for the
privilege arises and the official bears full responsibility.48 Similarly, if, having no
obligation himself, an official communicates to one who does have an obligation
to receive the communication, the privilege which arises is, at most, no more
than that which any private citizen commands in similar circumstances.
The reported cases have mostly concerned vertical communications, i.e.,
communications within the same executive hierarchy. The question arises
whether horizontal communications, i.e, communications between executive
hierarchies (as when the Secretary of Labor informs the Secretary of Commerce
that one of the latter's employees is incompetent or dishonest), are entitled to
absolute or conditional immunity. The Donner case involved a vertical communication, but its language implicitly recognized that an occasion for absolute immunity might arise in horizontal communications. When the requisite obligations exist on both ends of the communication there is no reason why the communication should be less privileged simply because it crossed departmental
lines. Such reciprocal obligations will exist less frequently in horizontal than in
vertical communications, but where they do exist, it seems inevitable that the
privilege will attach.49
If the privilege is to be limited at all it should not be in terms of the direction
of the communication. Yet a limitation coextensive with the existence of an
"'occasion" is too broad in that trivial official functions performed maliciously
are protected at the expense of individual reputations. The privilege should be
limited according to the social importance of the duties of the officer in question.
Such a standard is necessarily vague, but it seems the only one pertinent to the
policy of the privilege. At least it would alter the result in the more extreme
instances of the granting of the privilege. 5
4 Bingham v. Gaynor, 203 N.Y. 27, 96 N.E. 84 (1911), where charges by a private citizen
filed with the mayor informing him of the police commissioner's incompetence and criminality
could claim only a qualified privilege but no absolute privilege.
The severity of the absolute privilege, though limited to public officers, calls for its restriction
to the discharge of the proper duties of these men and cannot, therefore, encompass the broad
fields of moral or social obligation. Consequently, when an officer steps beyond the pale of such
duties, he can claim no more protection than could a private citizen in the same circumstances.
Colpoys v. Gates, 118 F. 2d 16 (App. D.C., 1941); Jacobs v. Herlands, 17 N.Y.S. 2d 711
(S. Ct., 1940), aff'd, 259 App. Div. 823, 19 N.Y.S. 2d 770 (1940); Tanner v. Stevenson, 138
Ky. 578, 128 S.W. 878 (1910).
18E.g., Murray v. Brancato, 290 N.Y. 52, 48 N.E. 2d 257 (1943), where a judge, in sending a defamatory opinion to an unofficial reporter, acted beyond his judicial function, there
being no duty to make such communication.
"1E.g., Schlinkert v. Henderson, 331 Mlich. 284, 49 N.W. 2d 180 (1951), where the communication was a letter by a member of the Liquor Control Commission to the Civil Service
Commission protesting a reorganization plan for his agency and the proposed employment of

the plaintiff.
10See authority cited note 25 supra; White v. Holderby, 192 F. 2d 722 (C.A. 5th, 1951)
(board of education); McAlister & Co. v. Jenkins, 214 Ky. 802, 284 S.W. 88 (1926) (real estate
commission).
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Matson v. Margiotti ' presents a troublesome illustration of the principles discussed. Defendant Margiotti, Pennsylvania's Attorney General, wrote officially
to the District Attorney of Allegheny County complaining of the "communistic
activities" of plaintiff, an attorney on the prosecutor's staff.52 Margiotti concluded that these activities rendered plaintiff unfit for her position and he demanded her immediate dismissal for the safety of the commonwealth. Before
mailing the letter, defendant released it to the newspapers. Twelve days later,
defendant again wrote informing the District Attorney of the appointment of
a deputy to conduct a public investigation of plaintiff's "alleged communistic
leanings, sympathies and utterances." She was to be afforded "every opportunity to be heard with counsel and witness."53 Plaintiff, however, secured an injunction against the proposed hearing and on appeal, the injunction was unanimously upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.54 The Justice Department,
51371 Pa. 188, 88 A. 2d 892 (1952).
For brevity certain passages are abstracted to indicate the content and tone of defendant's letter:
"As a result of an investigation... I have ascertained the following facts with regard to
Marjory Hanson Matson....
"1. While... a student.
she had the reputation among her fellow-students of having
Communist tendencies. I am reliably informed that she attended school at the Young Communist League and that she was one of the principal demonstrators against General MacArthur... in 1932.
"2. I am informed that Mrs. Matson is on the Executive Board of American-Soviet
Friendship and was one of the organizers of the Progressive... Party ....
"3. . . . Mrs. Matson undertook to act as Counsel for Bernard Salis... on an appeal from
a conviction of Salis for violation of a McKeesport ordinance forbidding the passing out of
literature without a permit. The literature... was signed by the Communist Party of Westera Pennsylvania.... She claims she was representing the American Civil Liberties Union in
appearing on behalf of Salis.
"4. ... Mrs. Matson sat in the courtroom with counsel, who was defending Nathan
Alberts in the Highland Park Riot Case. Alberts is Secretary of the Pittsburgh Branch of the
Communist Party....
"5. In the Post Gazette... the following appears:
'The Pittsburgh Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, in a letter to President
Truman, has protested the prosecution of 12 leading Communists "for holding beliefs and
opinions rather than committing overt acts." "Even in a period of near-hysteria, which this
admittedly is, no restrictions should be placed upon the competition of ideas in the marketplace of public opinion," Mrs. Marjory Hanson Matson wrote the President. Mrs. Matson,
local A.C.L.U. representative and an assistant district attorney, was careful to point out
that her organization bars communists, Bundists and other supporters of dictatorships from
serving in its high offices."'
The letter details other similar "communistic activities" of the plaintiff and concludes:
"As Attorney General ... I am writing this letter to demand that Mrs. Matson be dismissed from her position as Assistant District Attorney in Allegheny County, as it appears
obvious that her Communistic associations render her unfit to hold this position. Her future
retention obstructs justice and becomes dangerous to the security of our people in Pennsylvania." Ibid., at 190-92 and 893-94.
13Matson v. Jackson, 368 Pa. 283, 285, 83 A. 2d 134, 135 (1951). As the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court said, "it was apparently... [defendant's] intention to 'try' Mrs. Matson
in regard to her loyalty, with a deputy appointed by him to act as 'judge."' Ibid.
54
Ibid.
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said the court, may investigate any violation of the law, but here there was no
allegation of wrongdoing. To hold otherwise would entitle the Attorney General
to conduct hearings as to the political, economic and social views of every public officer
in the Commonwealth entrusted with the execution of the laws, from the Governor
himself down ...in order to ascertain whether, in his opinion, they are fit and competent....
Nor could the Attorney General's power to supersede local officers provide a
basis for the hearings. General qualifications and views are not a basis for supersession."
Plaintiff then instituted the instant case, a libel suit, on the publication of
the charges in the first letter. 57 Defendant demurred, claiming absolute immunity, and was upheld on appeal in a three-to-two decision by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court.5" Both the majority and the minority agreed that the letter
was libelous per se. The majority, relying on Spalding v. Vilas,59 stated that the
Attorney General has absolute immunity when acting within his official powers
but that it "may be abused and lost and.., becomes unavailable if and when
the Attorney General ...acts in matters outside his jurisdiction or beyond the
scope of his powers and duties.""0 The question then was whether the acts complained of were within his powers. The court felt that although defendant's
powers did not extend to investigating plaintiff's general competence, his "wide
and vast" powers as chief law enforcement officer enabled him to inform the
District Attorney of plaintiff's activities. He could not compel plaintiff's discharge, but he had the right and duty to demand it. The dissent severely criticized the majority's departure from the Jackson case. That decision, the minority said, prescribed the limits to the defendant's official duties. Since he was
without legal power to clarify or investigate his charges, a fortiori it was outside
his official powers to make them. Having acted beyond his official duties, the
most he could claim was a qualified privilege. To characterize his powers as
"wide and -Vast" made him virtually omnipotent.
hIbid.,
at 288 and 136.
51Ibid., at 289 and 137.
Itis interesting to note the alternative grounds upon which the plaintiff could have
brought her action. First, there was the possibility of suit upon the second letter in which the
defendant announced his intention to hold the hearings. The allegations in the letter were undoubtedly libelous per se, and they were made not to inform the District Attorney of plaintiff's
qualifications, which defendant had already done, but to define the proposed hearing. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had already held that the attempt to hold the hearings was not
within defendant's duties or powers. Having no duty toward the subject of his communication,
defendant could claim only a conditional privilege. Second, plaintiff might have sued the
newspapers which published the libel. It seems probable that the newspapers had no absolute
immunity. See Defamation Immunity, 18 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 591 (1951).
18Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A. 2d 892 (1952). Defendant had two possible defenses: (1) privilege and (2) truth. He did not plead truth and "his counsel stated at the bar
of the Court that a Committee of the Allegheny Bar Association had cleared Mrs. Matson of
any charges of Communism." Ibid., at 193 and 895.
59161 U.S. 483 (1895).
60Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 196, 88 A. 2d 892, 896 (1952).
57
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Applying the rule that both the sender and the recipient of a defamatory
communication must bear a legal obligation, duty, or interest in relation to the
subject matter of the communication before absolute privilege will attach, it
seems clear that here the District Attorney had such a duty or interest in receiving the communication. If the defendant had no corresponding duty, he
could claim only a conditional privilege subject to defeasance if the communication was made from improper motives. 61 In deciding whether such a duty
existed, it is noteworthy that defendant could not compel plaintiff's discharge.
That indicates that here there was no unbroken line of authority from superior
to subordinate, such as exists within a single executive hierarchy. Thus, defendant's duty did not arise from a responsibility and power to hire and discharge. The situation was akin to a horizontal communication between independent departments rather than a vertical communication between superior
and subordinate. In such a case, general administrative powers over the.field of
law enforcement would not seem to provide the legal obligation which the
sender of libelous messages must have for absolute immunity to arise. The
charge against plaintiff was not one of criminality. The dissent rightly pointed
out that by the majority reasoning, "the Attorney General lacks official power
to inquire into and investigate what the majority now says he had an official
62
duty to charge."
IV
Even more questionable was the majority's decision that defendant's absolute immunity extended to his release of his letter to the press. A press publication of a libel is far more damaging to reputation than a private communication between officials. Though there is a dearth of authority on this point, some
precedent other than the Spalding case and Glass v. Ickes,63 cited by the court,
does exist. The court might have found support in three cases, 4 which it did not
61

Perhaps the court was influenced by the severity of the Pennsylvania rule of qualified
privilege. The court stated the rule: "defendant in a libel suit who relies upon the defense of
conditional privilege has the burden of proving that the communication was published on a
conditionally privileged or proper occasion, from proper motive, in a proper manner and was
based on reasonable and probable cause." Ibid., at 196 and 896. Thus, the defendant, once
the threshold tort is established, bears the burden of proving not only the "occasion" for
the privilege but also those elements of propriety which, in other jurisdictions, are presumptively credited to his cause. Conditional privilege is granted in the first instance because of a
decision that defendant's function is socially beneficial and defendant is therefore given the
benefit of the doubt. Thus, the policy of granting a conditional privilege is contradictory to the
Pennsylvania rule which requires that its pleading be supported by evidence sufficient to sustain any other defense. Yet the harshness of the Pennsylvania rule is not adequate reason to
grant defendant absolute immunity in the instant case, for the facts seem to indicate that he
deserves no presumption of good faith.
1Ibid., at 212 and 902.
61Glass v. Ickes, 117 F. 2d 273 (App. D.C., 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 718 (1941).
64For other cases involving a press publication of libel, see Peeples v. State, 179 Misc. 272,
38 N.Y.S. 2d 690 (Ct. Cl., 1942) (qualified privilege granted to press publication of the official
report of the state audit department, based on the public importance of the report); Colpoys v.
Gates, 118 F. 2d 16 (App. D.C., 1941) (privilege denied to a U.S. marshal's public explanation
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cite, involving high public officials as defendants. The first, Adams v. TVard,11
concerned a release to the press by the defendant, Secretary of the British Army
Council, of an official report of that body. The plaintiff, on the floor of Parliament, had accused an army officer of misconduct which had caused the plaintiff's dismissal from the service. The Army Council's report, vindicating the accused officer, reflected upon the plaintiff's character. The House of Lords held
that absolute privilege clothed both the report and the press release; the latter
on the grounds that the public importance of the issue, calling in question as it
did the integrity of the armed forces, warranted publication to the general public
of whatever facts might clear the military.
A similar case, Mellon v. Brewer," arose over the press release by the Secretary of the Treasury of his report to the President. The plaintiff, a special assistant to the Attorney General, had made somewhat discredited charges of irregularities in the issuance of government bonds. The Secretary's report defended his department and impugned the good faith of the plaintiff. In holding the
report and its release to the press absolutely privileged, the Supreme Court explained that the plaintiff's charges, undermining public confidence in the fiscal
7
agency, rendered it imperative that the charges be refuted publicly.
In both of these cases, the release to the press was justified because the defendants were publicly defending against charges publicly made. 8 Had plaintiff's charges been made only to an interested official, defendants would have
had no justification for releasing the defamatory remarks to the press. The "occasion" conferring absolute immunity arose because the public attacks created
in the public an interest in receiving the communication by the defendants.
Where the interested party is the general public, the press is a proper medium of
communication.
In Ryan v. Wilson,"9 the plaintiff had been Assistant Attorney General of
Iowa in an administration prior to that of the defendant, the present Governor.
of his discharge of his deputies); Bingham v. Gaynor, 203 N.Y. 27, 96 N.E. 84 (1911) (privilege
denied to press publication of charges against the police commissioner before delivery to
mayor; in fact such publication was deemed to have destroyed the qualified privilege adhering
to charges).
s[19171 A.C. 309.
6618 F. 2d 168 (App. D.C., 1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 530 (1927).
67
The court emphasized that the Treasury Department's efficiency and its integrity had
been brought under fire, that the confidence of the public in their agency was in danger of
being seriously undermined, and that the problem had become one of vital public concern.

Therefore, the public had an interest in receiving from the defendant a complete statement
of the facts.

18This point presents an interesting analogy to the so-called right of self-defense in defamation involving private parties. "The law seems to be well-setted that when one is attacked
by defamatory matter published in the press, one may resort to the same methods to reply
to or to rebut the charges made." Israel v. Portland News Publishing Co., 152 Ore. 225, 53
P. 2d 529 (1936).
6, 231 Iowa 33, 300 N.W. 707 (1941).
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The defendant released to the press the report of the auditor on the receivership
division of the state department of banking. In a minor reference, the report alleged that the plaintiff, while an official, had received a legal fee in a bank receivership. Shortly thereafter, this was discovered to be in error and the defendant promptly acknowledged this to the press. The court held that the defendant had acted within his duty. The report was a public document of general
interest and the defendant had a "duty" to give the public whatever information
he had by the most effective means available. In this he was absolutely privileged. The court, however, was not wholly convinced by its argument. "[I]f we
are wrong in our conclusion that the privilege was absolute, it was certainly a
qualified privilege." 70 This, in the absence of any indication of malice, was sufficient.
This case differs from the Margiotti situation in that here the defendant released a document by its nature public through the best means of communication, whereas defendant in the Margiotti case released a libelous accusation
which it was not his business to make and which the public had no duty to receive. Perhaps a statement of plaintiff's activities would have been proper for
such release. A loose charge that plaintiff was communistic was not.
However, the Margiotticourt relied upon none of these decisions but upon the
Spalding and Ickes cases. In the former, the publication was by letter. The Supreme Court there held that
[t]he act of the head of one of the departments of the government in callingthe attention
of any person having business with such department to a statute relating in any way to
such business, cannot be made the foundation of a cause of action against such
officers.7
The Ickes case centered on a press release by the Secretary of the Interior addressed to all oil operators warning them against plaintiff's solicitation of funds
and stating that he had been barred from practice before the agencies of the department (as were all other ex-employees for a two-year period-a fact the Secretary failed to mention). Relying upon a misinterpretation of the Mellon case,
the court said that communications released to the press are generally within
the executive powers of a department head,72 although there may be circumstances "under which an official would exceed his prerogatives in issuing a particular communication to the press." 7 3 But it seemed clear from the Spalding
case that
a cabinet officer is within his official right or prerogative, hence absolutely privileged,
in informing persons having business with his department of official action affecting
such business together with a relevant explanation thereof.74
7
0Ibid., at 51 and 716.
7

Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 493 (1895) (emphasis added).
would seem to be an incorrect interpretation of the Mellon case. The press release
there was justified not on pure executive power as this court claims, but upon the vital public
interest in the Secretary's report.
73 117 F. 2d 273, 277 (App. D.C., 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 718 (1941).
72This

74

Ibid., at 280.
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Applying this rule, the court concluded that Ickes' action was within his official powers. Yet here the publication involved the general public, which had
no conceivable interest or duty to receive the communication. A concurring
opinion voiced the fear that
in this and previous cases we may have extended the rule beyond the reasons out of
which it grew and thus unwittingly created a privilege so extensive as to be unlimited
and altogether subversive of the 75
fundamental principle that no man in this country is
so high that he is above the law.

Thus, the cases present two rationales for rendering absolutely privileged a
cabinet officer's use of the public press. The Mellon and Adams cases recognized
that, because of the social importance of the released reports, the interested
party was actually the general public and so the press was a proper means of
communication. The social importance of the communications in both cases
arose from the prior public attacks of the plaintiffs. Without the plaintiffs' accusations and the consequent creation of a public interest, neither communication by the defendants would have possessed the requisite importance to justify
release to the press.
The Ickes case sought justification of the press release in the defendant's purpose to inform those dealing with his department of facts important to their relationship. The court ignored the problem of excessive publication. Communication by mail or administrative bulletin would have sufficed to reach such a restricted class of interested recipients and hence defendant should have received
only a qualified privilege as to the press release. The Ickes case also suggests, as
the concurring opinion indicates, that an executive officer may possess immunity for almost any press release he cares to make. However, this dictum is supported neither by the cases nor by any intelligible policy. Both the Mellon and
Adams rule and the Ickes rule, then, are subsumed under the general rule that
to be privileged a communication must be directed to those who have an interest in receiving it.
In any event, the Margioltimajority cited the wrong authority for a doubtful
proposition.7" There was, in the instant case, no immediate and vital public interest in the defendant's reyelation, no public attack by the plaintiff upon the
integrity of the government, such as justified publication in the Mellon and
Adams cases. Nor was there a pressing need to communicate to vitally interest7

1Ibid., at 282. See Edwards, op. cit. supra note 7,at 74, for a discussion of this case--"it is
difficult to explain in what respect the Secretary's action [the press release] was in the performance of an afficial [sic] function."
76 The majority bases

its case on the public's right to be informed of the particular acts of its

officials. This assertion neither squares with the authorities the court cited, i.e., the Spalding
and Ickes cases, nor finds any recognition in other decisions. Its closest support is a dictum
in Colpoys v. Gates, 118 F. 2d 16 (App. D.C., 1941), where the court said in refusing relief to

a U.S. marshal's public explanation of the discharge of deputies, "Cabinet officers have a political function and public interest is thought to require that they be not restricted by fear of
libel suits from publicly explaining their acts and policies." Ibid., at 17. The danger of this
doctrine is apparent. No tenable limits are in view and though the general philosophy has much
to recommend it, it is not apparent why a qualified privilege is, in reality, insufficient.
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ed, widely dispersed parties via the press, as the Ickes case would have it, which
would justify Margiotti in riding roughshod over plaintiff's reputation. Even
the slender justification of releasing an essentially public document, as in the
Ryan case, was absent here; and the Ryan court was unsure whether the defendant had an absolute or qualified immunity.
Perhaps the closest precedent to the Margiottisituation is found in Jacobs v.
Herlands,7 a New York case which arose over the disappearance of $50,000 from
a government bureau. The defendant, apparently a prosecutor or special investigator, called a press conference at which he announced his intention to investigate the plaintiff's bank account in connection with the crime. The court held
absolute privilege not available as a defense.
No prosecuting officer or investigator is justified, in anticipation of finding evidence of
wrongdoing, in making a public statement to the press which injures the reputation of
any person. With due regardfor the right of the public to be informed of the conduct of its
officials, the timefor such information to be given is after evidence of wrongdoing has been
obtained. The rights of the individual, as well as the rights of the public, are to be considered.78

It therefore appears that defendant Margiotti should have been granted only
a conditional or qualified immunity. 9
CONCLUSION

The Margiotti decision wrongly granted absolute immunity both to defendant's letter and to its release to the press. The result conforms in no way to the
policy which alone justifies the privilege. The law of absolute immunity for executive communications is muddled; the underlying problems unresolved. The
contribution of the Margiottiopinion to their solution is extremely slender.
7717 N.Y.S. 2d 711 (S. Ct., 1940), aff'd, 259 App. Div. 823, 19 N.Y.S. 2d 770 (1940).
78Ibid., at 713 (emphasis added).

79If the press had absolute immunity for its printing of defendant's letter on the ground
that it is a record libel, it would appear that defendant should possess the same immunity for
his publication of the libel to the press. Conceivably, however, one who makes a record libel
should be without absolute immunity for publishing it to the press. The opportunities for
politically-motivated abuse under the opposite rule are obvious. Another answer is that newspapers probably do not have absolute immunity in printing record libel. See Defamation
Immunity, 18 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 591 (1951). Further, it does not appear that defendant's
letter is the sort of official record which newspapers can publish. Unlike record libel in regular
judicial, legislative, or executive proceedings, defendant's letter could not have been obtained
by the press were it not for defendant's publication to them. Thus, the argument fails that
defendant should share the absolute immunity of the press.

LATENT EQUITIES
Whether the assignee of a chose in action takes the chose subject to "latent
equities" has been a debatable issue among scholars for over a century. Levenbaum v. Hanover Trust Companyl presents a typical "latent equity" problem.
-1253 Mass. 19, 148 N.E. 227 (1925).

